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AND THE FACE OF THE INTERNATIONAL ORDER
Louis F .E. Goldie
1. INTRODUCTION:
DEFINITION AND MEANING

Endemic among you there is, I know,
either skepticism about the claims of
international law to reflect a legal order
or annoyance at both the restraints you
feel that international law imposes on
you and the protections it seems, from
your perspective, to give to wrongdoing
states. Today I am going to try to
dissolve that skepticism and to demonstrate that, although you may feel international law's restraints to be irksome,
they can also limit your adversary, your
competitor, so that he too can be
brought to feel their discipline. Much,
indeed, of what arouses your skepticism
or engages your impatience may not so
often be the restraints of law as chosen
policies of self-restraint or of permissiveness to others. International law may
not, in all cases, require the kind of
conduct which engages your cynicism.
But first we need to clear up a few
preliminary matters; for example, what
we mean by such terms as "law" and
"international law. "
Many people ask, when they look at
the international order and see that
there are none of the regular institutions
of a domestic legal order, no legislature,
no executive with law-enforcement
authority, and no system of courts with

compulsory jurisdiction: "How can internationallaw be law at all?" Now this
brings me to my first point. Only too
often people confuse a significant discussion about the nature of things, or
the nature of law, as in this case, with a
trivial argument about the meaning of
words. Let me illustrate this.
Most people's concept of law, even
today, is based on an authoritarian
model which can be stated in general
terms as a general command issued by a
sovereign authority owning no political
superior, enforced by the authority of a
system of courts, and administered by
an executive authority. This is one
generally accepted definition of the
word "law." But it is a very narrow,
restricted view of the law, and it leaves
out of account very many kinds of law,
even very many kinds of domestic law.
On the other hand, its wide acceptance
stems from the English Utilitarians of a
century and a half ago, especially
Jeremy Bentham and John Austin, and
their extensive program of domestic
legislative reform. One consequence of
this positivist, utilitarian definition of
law was that international law came to
be characterized as "positive morality."
This illustrates my point. Stipulate a
narrow definition of the word "law,"
and international law is excluded. On
the other hand, if you stipulate a
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broader definition of law, international
law will be included. This reminds me
about all the controversy which has
been plaguing the world of literature for
about a hundred years: "Did William
Shakespeare really write those plays he
is credited with?" One answer is: "If he
did not, then somebody else called
William Shakespeare did. "
If anyone says to me, "I stipulate a
definition of law which will exclude
international law. Therefore international law is not law," I will say, "Well,
your second sentence, your conclusion,
is unnecessary; it was already inherent
in your premise. If you stipulate that
kind of a definition of law, that is your
business. And I do not wish to argue
over trivialities. But I would like to
point out that you are probably wrong
in your concept of what law is." This
last is not a trivial point. It is something
we should think about-what the nature
of law is, what its uses are, how we may
best employ it, and how, indeed, it can
be utilized to the advantage of the
Navy, of the United States, of the world
community, rather than treat it as a
counter in a parlor game with words.
II. A LEGAL SYSTEM AT WORKSOME "STILL" PICTURES
I will start my discussion of this
topic of finding some common models
or pictures of a legal system with the
idea that most of us find international
law a difficult concept to grasp, or a
difficult thing to think about, because
our everyday ordinary way of thinking
about law is the product of common
experiences-these produce the models
we have in our heads. For example, a
common model of the legal system at
work is the picture of a traffic policeman booking us for making a left-hand
turn out of a right-hand lane. Now we
know there is a rule, we know there is a
person in authority, and we know we
have done the wrong thing. And this is
an easy and simple approach to giving us

a model or picture of what law is.
Behind the policeman is the State Legislature which authorized the writing (or
indeed may have written itself as is the
case in some states) the Rules of the
Road, including the strict requirement
about not making left-hand turns out of
right-hand lanes. The policeman himself
is appointed under laws written by the
State Legislature, and ultimately his
appointment has to be valid, as the legal
provision our citizen has offended has
to be valid, under the Constitution of
the State and that of the United States.
There is thus a legal system which bears
down on us, possessing the powerful
and vast machinery of a sovereign state,
complete with legislature, authoritative
executive, and, finally, courts with compulsory jurisdiction. (If you make a
left-hand turn out of a right-hand lane
you will probably find yourself in one
of the very minor courts of a great
hierarchy of judicial institutions.) In
addition to showing our motoring citizen as feeling very sorry for himself
while the officer writes out the ticket
and says, "You shouldn't have done
that, sir," or words to that effect, there
is a vast background which the legal
order provides to this trivial legal event.
Insofar as this incident has legal significance, it involves the whole domestic
legal order and is governed by it. In this
way we all see the secure order of great
richness in commands or, better, prescriptions, rules, institutions, and validly
appointed legal authorities which keep
our complex society functioning with
the minimum of friction and waste.
Then we look to international law and
we see none or, at best very little of this
institutional richness and depth of legal
rules, institutions, experience, authority, and power.
I have gone into some detail with this
picture, this common model of the legal
order, since many of us and our fellow
citizens carry it in their heads as their
belief that it constitutes a "hard-core"
example of the legal system at work-
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the citizen in his automobile and the
traffic policeman on his motorcycle.
This is also in that area of law which
most pe9ple regard as the paradigm of
the legal order-the enforcement of the
criminal law. Let us now go a little
further. Do you think that in many
cases when the U.S. Government, for
example, may have to deal with organized crime in the United States, the
law enforcement situation is so simple?
It seems to me that some research
worker could probably uncover an
enormous and intricate system of negotiation, concession, surrender, giving
ground, claiming ground, and so on, in
many of the major cases which the
Federal Government or a State government brings against a major representative of organized crime, in order to
conduct the case ultimately to the
conviction and punishment of the
accused. It seems that when we observe
governments prosecuting major underworld figures we are already a long way
from the clear-cut law-enforcement
situation of the policeman and the
motorcar driver or the policeman and
the petty criminal. Let us go another
step further.
Outside the realm of criminal lawand you will notice that I have kept my
pictures, so far, in the realms of criminal
law-we find that there are many more
diverse ways in which the law operates
than we are apt to expect inside the area
of criminal law. We find that the legal
system appears, mainly, to provide the
citizen with the procedures, with the
means, of doing the sort of things he
wants to do. The Law of Real Property
is not only a law which tells trespassers
to keep off your property or be prosecuted; it is also a law, a body of very
intricate law, that tells you how you can
enjoy what you have and, if you have
the right kind of interest, the many
ways in which you can transmit that
interest or the fruits of it to other
people; what it can be worth to you in a
money sense-given the state of the

market-and how you can enjoy it to its
best advantage. This is not telling you
not to do something. There is here
nothing like an equivalent of disobeying
a prohibition-for example, making a
left-hand turn out of a right-hand lane
or even of belonging to a powerful
syndicate of criminals running illegal
"business ventures." This area of law
tells you what you can do with your
own so as to effectuate the ma.ximum of
enjoyment to yourself and with maximum advantage to your neighbors.
Again, when a civilian writes a will
there are certain rules that he must
fulfill; for example, he must have his
signature attested to by a certain number of witnesses (the actual number
depending on state law); also he must
follow certain other basic procedures. It
would, therefore, be wrong to say that
the law relating to the writing of wills
consists of commands given by a legislature and enforced by sanctions-by the
threat of prosecution and punishment.
After all, what is the sanction if someone writes a will and fails to have it
testified to by the right number of
witnesses? The will may be invalid, but
the citizen will not be punished by any
decision to invalidate his will. After all,
he is dead! In this kind of a situation, it
seems silly to call nullification a sanction, a threat of punishment.
The system, the laws we have on
writing wills, are what we may call
facultative or facilitating rules. So are all
the rules which tell us, and institutions
which tell us, how to do what we want
to do in the best way for ourselves and
our fellow citizens.
Thus we see that law-even law
within these United States-is something
far more pervasive, far less clear-cut,
than a prohibition, an offense, a policeman, and a lower court. We need to give
it a far wider definition. Now the
interesting thing is onee we move away
from the idea that the legislature, executive, and courts with compulsory jurisdiction are essential to the existence of
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a legal system, almost any other definition of law includes international law_
If, for example, we are prepared to say
that a legal system consists of a process
of authoritative decisionmaking, in
which basic values become reflected in
social action by means of the decisional
process and through the agency of the
authoritative decisionmakers (including
courts, but not restricted to them), then
we find that international law fits into
that definition quite well. Again, if we
add thereto the concept of law as a
system of facilitative means of social
interaction and communication which
contains prohibitions only where interaction extends beyond what is permissible in a mutually viable system,
then, here too, we find that international law quite clearly fits within our
definition. Also, if we state that it is a
most important means of directing participants' efforts for the realization of
common values, then, again, international law fits in with such a definition
of law. Now, I have stressed the problem of definitions because I really want
to underline the distinction between the
trivial point of arguing about the
meaning of words and the important
point which calls for an investigation of
the nature of things. I must also point
out that the definitions of law which I
have just indicated seem far closer to
the nature of law than the more traditional one which emphasizes power and
enforcement at the expense of interaction and direction. I will close this
section of my presentation by pointing
out to you that international law provides prohibitions whieh states, like
individuals, take into account when
calculating the chances of success a
given policy may have. In addition, and
more significantly perhaps, it exists as a
system of decisionmaking, of process,
and of communication. Assuming a
knowledge of international law is like
assuming a knowledge of language. You
can cue your friends and your rivals as
to your intentions and then indicate to

them those of their options which are
acceptable to you-and those which are
unacceptable. Your game plans, incidentally, should include the choice of
your adversaries' selecting unacceptable
options. These, again, should be clearly
discernible through the language of internationallaw.
III. THE NATURE OF
INTERNATIONAL LAWRESPONSES TO SOME CRITICISMS
A. The Problem of State Sovereignty
There is a more sophisticated variant
of the skeptics' position which we have
just discussed, namely that international
law cannot be "law properly so called"
since it is not issued by a sovereign
commander, is not supported by sanctions, and is not administered by courts
with compulsory jurisdiction. That
more sophisticated variation takes up
the concept of sovereignty from a new
point of view. It argues, not on the
footing of international law's failure to
indicate its own sovereign, but rather,
that since it is an order of sovereign
nations, it cannot for that reason also be
a legal order. More briefly, this argument holds that national sovereignty is
inconsistent with international law. The
inarticulate premise of such an argument is that if a legal system is itself the
child of sovereign authority it cannot, at
the same time, incorporate many sovereigns. The restricted definition of law
itself, which I outlined earlier, comes up
again. It is translated into this new
inverted perspective of sovereignty and
the international order.
But what do we mean when we talk
of national sovereignty? From the point
of view of international law, the sovereignty of a state is not an extralegal or
metalegal concept. Rather, it is a basic
concept of international law and is
defined by it. Sovereignty is the term
used to describe the competence which
the international law ascribes to states.

I
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We tend, perhaps, to think of sovereignty in absolute terms. Yet no state is
sovereign in the world today in the same
sense that the Roman Empire was sovereign in the Mediterranean Basin, in, say,
A.D. 100. The difference between then
and now is that although every contemporary state is said to be sovereign, each
one must recognize and act in terms of
the sovereignty of all the others. For all
sovereign states act and interact in the
common arena of international relations
wherein international law facilitates
their peaceable interactions and is
formulated to limit, where it cannot
prevent, states' hostile or violent interactions. International law thus may be
seen, at one and the same time, as
according and ascribing to states their
sovereign authority as the form of competence they enjoy in the international
arena and placing the necessary limits
on that competence in order to limit,
and to humanize, collisions in its mutual
and interacting exercise. In contrast
with the contemporary world where
more than 120 states interact in the
same area of action, the sovereign situation of the Roman Empire existed
simply because there were no other
states interacting with it to limit its
sovereignty. By contrast with the example from the Roman world, the
contemporary states' interaction calls
for the ascription of competences to
states. We denominate these competences "sovereignty," which becomes a
legally defined and a relative concept.
Admittedly, that definition is in extremely wide terms; but there are limits
to it. There are limits to it set by
treaties and by customary law. Examples of the customary law limitation
on state sovereignty are states' universal
recognition of the immunity of foreign
sovereigns, their diplomats, and their
warships in receiving states' ports. At
such points as these, and even on the
territory of the United States, our legal
sovereign power stops short. It meets
the opposing and countervailing sover-

eign competence of a foreign country.
Thus, while it is so latitudinarily defined
as, possibly, to weaken and undermine
the orderliness of the international legal
order, the concept of state sovereignty
does not contradict that order. It cannot do so, because it is, itself, a derivative of that order.

B. The Problem of Commitment
Tied in with the problems which the
looseness of the international order presents is a criticism which looks, at first
blush, like a restatement of the argument we have just disposed of when
that is freed of its conceptualist impediment labeled "sovereignty." This attack
on international law, however, in reality
comes from a very different group of
theorists. Those who argue that national
sovereignty is inconsistent with international law, and is a logical denial of it,
are concerned about international law's
failure to develop into a highly integrated and formalized system of authority. The critics whose position we
are now going to review, on the other
hand, argue against international law's
validity on pragmatic grounds. They
argue that because, as it is clear on any
view of the way states behave toward
each other, no state has an overriding
and absolute commitment to the vindication of international law at all costs,
international law either does not exist in
international reality or, at most, does
not reflect a meaningful legal order. I
suggest to you that such a thesis is
completely beside the point It is,
furthermore, not only based on a cynical, Machiavellian view of the law, it is
also based on a misconception of the
relation of law and morals and of the
morality of obedience to law. Everyone
in this room has a sticking point where
he would not have an overriding and
absolute commitment to the vindication
of the domestic law of the United States
or of the State of Rhode Island. There
may be situations where the law may
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call upon a citizen to do things that go
against his basic moral ideas and which
he will withdraw from doing. Thus,
oncc we really start to look at the
criticisms involving the issue of commitment which frequently are sagely
adduced to deny the existence of international law-including those by such
eminent men as Dean Acheson, George
Kennan, and Professor Morgenthau-we
find that their positions turn on mistaken notions about either the meaning
of law or about the expectations people
might appropriately entertain of international law itself. Moreover, they do
not, perhaps, think sufficiently comparatively in order to evaluate how
people, in general, react to certain legal
rules which might be imposed before
they look at theorists' and states'
adverse reactions to specific rules or
doctrines of international law.
The cynical position we have just
reviewed is, of course, made all the
more plausible when we remember that
there is an issue many legal philosophers
overlook when discussing the way in
which legal systems work. The truism is
this: there is no legal rule for applying a
legal rule. Whenever any legal rule is
applied, it is applied by a human being
who is applying (a) his knowledge of
law; (b) his evaluation and characterization of the facts; (c) his ideas of the
relevance of the law he knows to the
facts before him; (d) the theory and
morality of law he entertains; and (e)
the policy goals of the law he holds to
be relevant to the case. Now I am
coming to one of the points I need to
emphasize this morning. You all carry
around with you your own moralities of
law and your own theories of law. You
are all legal philosophers, and you apply
your philosophies whenever you face a
legal problem or make a legal decision.
Your problem may well be that, although you operate from philosophical
premises about the nature and morality
of law when you apply a rule or discuss
the meaning of law, those premises are

mainly below the threshold of your
articulate thought. But, whether fully
articulated and at the forefront of your
minds, or operating as inarticulate
premises or unconscious prejudices,
they exist and they guide your knowledge and your thinking about law in
general and your application of law,
whether that is to enforce the discipline
of a ship, or to identify the relevance of
article 2, paragraph 4, of the Charter of
the United Nations to a specific situation or decision you may have to make.

c.

The Problem of Obligation

This leads me, then, to the third
point in our discussion of the meaning
and function of international law. At
least as significant a question about
international law as the question, "Is
international law really law?" is the
question: "Is international law really
binding?" This then leads on to the next
question: "And, if so, what is the nature
of international law's obligatoriness?"
Many critics of international law again
show their policeman hangup when we
come to this issue. They point to the
unsatisfactory means of enforcing international law. Owing to the deadlock of
the United Nations Security Council,
the only sanction is by the use of force
by states. In this context, however, we
may tend to underestimate the legal
significance of joint action by collective
self-defense. This, after all, was the
earliest form of law enforcement in
domestic legal systems and identified in
early Anglo-American law as the "hue
and cry." Be that as it may, it is still
unfortunately true that the general hue
and cry reflected in the United Nations
General Assembly's Uniting for Peace
Resolution has long been losing whatever effectiveness it may once have had.
Again, resort to reprisals by individual
states, once a significant sanction, is
ceasing to be effective for a myriad of
reasons, not the least important of
which, perhaps, are such prohibitions as
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those to be found in article 2, paragraph
4 of the United Nations Charter which
tells us that: "All Members shall refrain
in their international relations from the
threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence
of any state, or in any other manner
inconsistent with the purposes of the
United Nations."
But to say that because it cannot be
enforced, an obligation does not exist, is
nonsense. Clearly there are binding obligations in international law which states
could only flout with full knowledge of
the illegality of their conduct. We
should note two well-known facts here.
First, while states may act knowingly in
breach of international law from time to
time, their breaches are generally, indeed standardly, the result of decisions
to take calculated risks. That is, states
tend to take calculated risks regarding
how severe or painful other states'
condemnatory reactions will be.
Second, no matter how frequently one
state may breach its international obligations, it is always indignant at
breaches by other states. Hence it is
clear that states review both their own
and other countries' policies and conduct in the light of a widespread presumption that international law not
only exists, but also will be obeyed and
followed. Why should this be so? It is
clearly because each state. anticipates
that its own long-term advantage lies
more with the compliance of other
states with international law than attempting to survive in an international
order where international law has no
authority and creates no expectations.
Such an order would either be one of
chaos, where each state is entitled to
deny all claims by others not supported
by sufficient strength to enforce them,
one where there is no law but that of
the jungle and where no right can be
maintained except that of holding as
much as can be physically mastered, or,
alternatively, be one governed by the
totalitarian authority of a single world

empire. (For we may note, parenthetically, that even a world federal system
would still need to include much, if not
most, of the present order for many
years to come, and so should not be
viewed as a valid alternative to the
present order as much as one possible
development of it.)
Neither chaos on the one hand nor
subordination in a world empire on the
other has much appeal to most states,
hence their acceptance of the present
order in its broad outline and their
indignation at breaches of international
law by their fellow subjects of the
system. Often, indeed, states brazenness
when charged with breaches of their
own obligations appears to reflect their
acknowledgment of their duties and
their guilt at their evasions. They seem,
only too frequently, to remind us of the
self-indulgent Roman poet's confession,
videor meliora proboque, deteriora
sequor-I see the better and more
honorable course of conduct as I follow
the worse.
New states are currently accepting
the international legal system as an
order, while calling for specific changes
to those of the specific rules and doctrines which they consider irksome or
anachronistic. This is evidenced by their
rejection of the Communists' traditional
rejection of international law. It is also
reflected at the present time, interestingly enough, in Russia's willingness
(together with her satellites, as distinguished from China and hers) to
cooperate within the system, to abide
by an increasing (if uncertain) number
of the existing customary rules of international law in the name of "peaceful
coexistence" and to prefer the chicanery of a shabby diplomat over the
tactics of an outraged revolutionary.
This review of states' conduct as
standardly reflecting a general aeceptance of the international legal order as a
system should not blind us to the fact
that most of the new states are dissatisfied with, and many question the
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validity of, some of the rules we have
inherited from the past as part of
customary international law. But the
rejection of some traditional rules hy
some of the new states as irrelevant to
the present international order and the
questioning of others hy many should
not he confused with a total rejection of
the system. Rather, it is a demand for
peaceful legal change to reflect the
enormous social change in international
society which has gone on over the last
two decades. My message in this part of
my lecture simply hoils down to this:
We can, and should clearly distinguish
he tween demands for changing the
rules, doctrines, and institutions of
international law from demands for the
overthrow of the present international
legal system. The former note is loudly
and sometimes dissonantly struck, the
latter is hardly struck at all; except
sometimes in the rhetoric of an angry
politician speaking, usually, either for
home consumption only or in a spirit of
malicious gamesmanship.
D. Some Friends of International Law
and What They Have Wrought
One of the greatest disservices that
has heen performed to international law
hy its supporters is the overstatement of
the case for international law hy the
Great Optimists. In our culture we have
a long tradition of heing suspicious of
politics, politicians, and "the political"
-namely the making of political issues
out of issues which could he left to
economics, jurisprudence, sociology, or
any other science or psuedoscience. We
have, since the 17th century, since the
English Revolution, the French Revolution, the American Revolution, had a
hasic philosophical value, namely that
science and scientific man should replace politics and that ultimate scoundrel, political man. This, of course, was
the metaphysical hasis for justifying the
transfer of much activity, especially
economic activity, from the puhlic to

the private sector. Its corollary has heen
the proliferation of models of man as an
ohject of science, "economic man," the
"reasonahle man" of the law, and
"sociological profiles," to name hut a
few of the models of "scientific man."
The model of scientific man may have
originally developed as a metaphysical
foundation for the privatization of
social action. Today, paradoxically, it,
and the traditional hostility to "the
political," is leading to the proliferation
of hureaueracies as the most "scientifc"
means of ,directing predictahle conduct.
This phenomenon is as noticeable in the
international arena as it is elsewhere,
and little thought has heen given to
either the hasic justifications of such a
proliferation (except, possihly, the
political one of recruiting the leadership
of the developing world in favor of
international organizations hy demonstrating their attractions!) or to viahle
al ternatives.
Any philosophy which can offer a
program for eliminating the unpredictahle, temporizing, and covinous
qualities of political action and suhstitute the predictahle conduct of "scientific man" in place of it, offers a very
attractive dream. Particularly, from the
point of view of this lecture, the rise of
the science of jurisprudence and of the
reasonahle man, or bonus paterfamilias,
gives us a means of replacing politics hy
codes, constitutions, and treaties. The
precision of jurisprudence and of legal
logic could then, so the advocates of
mechanistic jurisprudence and mechanistic man aver, he called to replace the
imprecision of human life and the discretions of myriads of interacting individuals pursuing, in the puhlic arena,
their private goals. As I pointed out
earlier, this is an old hahit in our
culture. Let us rememher that at the
height of the Terror of the French
Revolution, France's extremely distinguished "hlueprint writer," Abhe
SiI!yes, helieved that all he had to do
was to draw up a hetter Constitution for
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France, and all that terror, all that
bloodshed, all those executions would
stop. He quite forgot that people tend
to kill other people for reasons which
are more compelling than the message
of some words on paper, no matter how
eloquently, rationally, or elaborately
these may be formulated. Optimistically
drawing up better documents, constitutions, treaties is, in a nutshell, what
some lawyers think they mean when
they refer to that vaguely menacing
ideal of "social engineering." (Others,
including myself, mean something quite
different, namely the improvement and
addition of precepts, institutions, and
procedures which facilitate intercourse,
communications, respect, and participation; we do not desire to engineer
society, only to engineer for society like
real engineers do with hardware.) Transferred to the international sphere, the
dream of the social engineers has proliferated, because many people believe
that the international legal order, above
all, requires special engineering. They
say that we can make peace permanent
and secure if we draw up a better treaty;
that if we appeal to the reason in men
to see that this treaty is in the best
interests of us all, everyone will agree
with it, and perpetual peace will result.
Now there are many people in this
country and abroad who believe this
fervently. And I have every sympathy
with them. I only wish, first, that they
were right; and second, that they did
not arouse so much skepticism in the
hearts of those who would otherwise be
merely lukewarm toward international
law. There is, unfortunately, a spillover
of the skepticism these idealists generate
toward the drawing of their more wayout blueprints which sometimes seems
to threaten to engulf international law
in general.
The professional optimists have done
international law a major disservice by
overstating the case for it. For them,
almost every international problem
becomes resolvable by a legal formula.

Now this, patently, is not true. Lawyers
operate on the assumption that all
disputes can be formulated clearly and
be made the objects of litigation, arbitration, or negotiation on the footing of
legal dialectic. Politicians, especially
those opposed to this legalistic approach, seek to avoid putting their
claims into legal, concrete, and binding
form. They prefer to view disputes as
tests of nerve and strength and so avoid
making their demands rationally explicit. This is sometimes also true of the
domestic sphere, especially in business
relations. (It may be of interest to
suggest that much of the problem the
courts face with regard to enforcing the
duty of good faith bargaining in labormanagement disputes tends to be related to the need to force parties to
negotiate on the footing of concrete
claims and counterclaims, rather than
on the raw basis of nerve and strength.)
The limits of what is appropriately a
legal decision are aU around us, even in
private life. For example, your attorney,
whom you wish to instruct to draw up
your will, may advise you as to how you
should draw up a trust for your children, but he is not going to tell you how
to make a detailed distribution of your
estate. He may advise you as to what
sort of claims should be responded to
when you draw your will. He may, in
addition, offer advice, in general terms,
about whom you should consider appropriate targets of your posthumous
bounty. And, in discussing some possible
basic family claims, he advises you because he is as much a trusted and knowledgeable friend as he is your lawyer,
although his experience as a lawyer may
render his advice all the more worth
heeding in this extra-professional context as well. But this is because he is a
man experienced not only in the writing
of wills, but in the way people make
posthumous distribution of their wealth
amongst their family and friends. In a
strictly professional sense he should, as
a lawyer, accept your instructions and
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should only tell you or warn you about
a distribution whieh you propose to
make which may be so unfair or inequitable to members of your family
that it might be open to attaek, in some
jurisdictions at least, after your death.
Where he gives you further advice he is
not solving your problems, he is helping
you make nonlegal decisions on how
you could best use the facilities the law
offers you. Incidentally, this excursus
about the interaction of choices and law
when it comes to making a will provides
an example of the way society provides
us with the means of doing what we
want or need to do through law.
We have already seen how international law is facilitative and functional.
We now note that it does not prescribe
the goals of human action (the goals, for
example, of human respect, participation, and dignity and freedom), although it may be formulated in terms of
such goals. These goals may be expressed by lawyers and he incorporated
in legal documents; but they remain
above and beyond the law, and the law
provides one of many means of
achieving them. For the ultimate demands we make on life and on society
are not legal demands. And it is a
mistake to try and substitute the needs
of life by the criteria of the law.

IV. INTERNATIONAL SOCIETY
AND LEGAL CHANGE
We are told that in the "Third
World"-the world of the developing
countries-the charge is laid against
international law that it is simply a form
of neoimperialism. Only too often, however, this rhetoric is an attempt to
forestall us in indicating to some of the
emerging or developing countries what
their legal obligations are. This is a piece
of gamesmanship we would do well not
to heed. On the other hand, these
countries are also telling us that they
have a demand for legal change. This is
something to which we should listen

most carefully. But, because we have
not been clear-cut in our thinking only
too often, our responses to gamesmen's
charges have been as conciliatory as
those to the people who are making
serious claims for legal change. Our own
confusion about international law has
encouraged others to assert the nonexistence, or the disuetude, of many
legal rights which have a lively claim for
contemporary respect, recognition, and
vindication. It is as if, being careless
about its own most valuable legal protection, namely law itself, the United
States were encouraging others to be
more careless about this country's rights
than they would normally be. But this is
an aside. We must tum back to our main
problem in this part of my lecture,
namely, that of legal change in intern ationallaw.
If, for the sake of an easy and
familiar model in its general outline at
least, we look at the domestic law of the
United States for an example, we see
the functioning legislatures as well as
the courts and the executives. Now we
know the function of a legislature is to
keep law in tune with society, or at least
we are told this is the function of the
legislature. In contrast with this situation, there is no legislature or any
similar institution in the international
legal order which can be called upon to
bring about timely legal change. But this
does not necessarily mean that international law is a body of archaic and
antiquated rules which can only be
found in the doctrines, writings, and
practices of 17th century Western
Europe which have remained unchanged
ever since. Despite its lack of the usual
accouterments of legal reform through
legislation and despite the fact that the
possession of a legislative organ would
possibly help international law to be
both more elegant and contemporary,
international law does change. It can, at
times, change with surprising speed.
States can change their legal rights and
obligations by entering into treaties, and
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more and more international law is
being expressed in multilateral conventions. States may also enter into regional agreements and bilateral treaties.
As far as those treaties are concerned,
states may also alter and redefine their
legal relations amongst themselves very
considerably. Again, a trend in bilateral
treaties may start a new development in
general customary international law.
For example, one of the most significant factors of the Alabama Claims
Arbitration was not that this was one of
the very early arbitrations to which
sovereign states resorted, despite the
very high and hostile feelings which ran
on each side, but also because it was
significant in the development of the
rules of neutrality. This arbitration was
called to decide a dispute between the
United States and Great Britain after
the defeat of the Southern Confederacy.
The United States asserted that Great
Britain had allowed the Alabama and
the Georgia and their warlike equipment, to be built and supplied by
British yards contrary to the latter's
duties as a neutral.
The parties met in head-on dispute
over the question of law since, at that
time, doubts still existed as to the duties
of a neutral state regarding the supply
of war vessels to a belligerent. But, by
the Treaty of Washington of 1871, the
parties agreed to the famous "Three
Rules" which have since then come to
be regarded as substantially reflecting
the customary international law duties
of neutrals and, with some changes,
have been formulated in article 8 of the
Hague Convention No. 13 of 1907.
They provide, in effect, that a neutral
state must use "due diligence" to prevent:
(1) the fitting out, arming, adapting,
or equipping of a vessel in its jurisdiction which it has reason to believe is
intended to cruise or otherwise engage
in hostile acts against a government with
which it is at peace;
(2) the departure of such a vessel,

once it has been fitted out, armed,
equipped, adapted or built, from its
jurisdiction; and
(3) violation of these duties within
its ports, roadsteads, and waters.
Thus, in addition to their utility as
defining, or redefining, the obligations
of the parties and to expressing agreement between states on a contractural
footing by setting an example for future
conduct, bilateral as well as multilateral
treaties can start new developments in
customary international law. Secondly,
legal change comes about by what is
regarded as a second source of law (as
prescribed in article 38 of the Statute of
the International Court of Justice),
namely by custom. Old customs can be
dispensed with. Long before the challenges of the modern age, for example,
the idea that a state could aequire
territory simply by discovering it had
disappeared well before the end of the
19th century as a result of the teehnological and population changes of that
century. In previous eenturies, when
explorations had been conducted in
leaky wooden hulks, propelled only by
sails or oars, an adventurer was able to
acquire territory for his sovereign
simply by an act of diseovery. In the
19th century, with the introduction of
iron- and steel-hulled steamships, we
find that to recognize this as a basis of
title becomes no longer feasible. There
would have been too many titleconferring "diseoveries"! Something
much more came to be required before
international law could recognize the
acquisition of territory-so occupation
came to be developed as a replacement
of discovery as a legal concept which
could validly provide states with original
titles to masterless lands. Occupation
called for more activity than discovery
did, namely a real "taking" of and
exercise of control over the territory in
question before it could be said to
belong to the claimant. Thus we have
here an early example of technological
and demographic change effecting a
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change in customary law. Today, of
course, customary law seems almost to
be withering before the rapidity of
technological and demographic change.
But this can be overstated. While some
aspects are withering, others, interestingly enough, are acquiring a new vigor
and are requiring a new restatement.

v.

THE CRISIS OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW
My last observation is not intended
to palliate the fact that international
law is in a state of crisis today. This has
many causes and more symptoms. Without any notion of ordering these in a list
of importance, I would like briefly to
indicate them as follows: the technological revolution; the population explosion; the decolonialization policies of
the former European empires (Western
European empires, not the Eastern
European ones) and the proliferation of
new "developing" states; the rise of
single-party states as the norm of the
developing world instead of the democratic two-party or multiparty politics
which had been hoped for and optimistically predicted at the time of the
independence of more new countries;
and, finally, revolutionary communism.
But, as I indicated earlier, these faetors
have not led to a widespread, root-andbraneh denial of international law, but
only to disputes as to the meaning,
scope, and content of specific rules, to
claims for legal change, and to an
acceleration of social change. This last,
the factor of acceleration, places international law under increasing stress on
aecount of the paucity of its. institutions
geared towards responding to the needs
of accelerated legal change.
On the other side of the coin we find
there is a great and very important
proliferation of universal and regional
agencies. The central organization in
international law is the United Nations;
but there arc many more international

agencies than just this one. And these
are becoming of increasing importance.
There are regional agencies such as the
Organization of American States and
collective self-defense arrangements like
the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.
There are important universal agencies
such as the Universal Postal Union and
the International Telecommunication
Union. These, I must emphasize, exist as
institutions of international law. Although you may not realize it, they
affect your daily lives. The fact that you
can have rapid and cheaply mailed
letters from anywhere in the world to
the United States, the fact that you can
send telegrams anywhere in the world
from the United States or receive television news items by satellite are due to
these and other important international
organizations.
Lastly, there is the peace-enforcing
function of regional o~ganizations. I will
just give you, as my time is running out,
one example. The Cuban Missile Crisis
in 1962, and the defensive quarantine
which was imposed in response thereto
were achieved through the procedures
and processes of the Organization of
American states. The U.S. Navy could
act as it did only through the intelligent
utilization of the United Nations
Charter and the Rio de Janeiro Pact.
Our trump card was the agreement of
the Organization of American States
that the Soviet missiles in Cuba were a
threat to this hemisphere. We may hope
that it is through the regional and
universal organs of peace and progress
that desirable legal change can be
brought about in a timely way and that
they will increasingly carry the burden
which has come to be too heavy for
customary international law and traditionally drafted treaties to bear alone.
It is for this reason that it is now
possible to discern an emerging quasicompetence on the part of international
organizations, and especially the United
Nations, to indicate, by their practice
and by their formulations of generally
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held basic values and programs of legal
change, emerging doctrines and precepts. These enjoy, in international law,
at least the equivalent of the "directive
principles" of the Indian and Irish constitutions. In some cases, furthermore,
they may have a more direct "self-

executing" effect They may offer a
new source of law responsive to both
the interests calling for change and
those promoting the values of stability
and continuity. To do so they must,
however, reflect a general, if not a
universal, consensus.

----tfi----

